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Kraepelin and degeneration theory
j Abstract Emil Kraepelin’s contribution to the
clinical and scientific field of psychiatry is recognized
world-wide. In recent years, however, there have been
a number of critical remarks on his acceptance of
degeneration theory in particular and on his political
opinion in general, which was said to have carried
‘‘overtones of proto-fascism’’ by Michael Shepherd
[28]. The present paper discusses the theoretical
cornerstones of Kraepelinian psychiatry with regard to
their relevance for Kraepelin’s attitude towards
degeneration theory. This theory had gained wide
influence not only in scientific, but also in philo-
sophical and political circles in the last decades of the
nineteenth century. There is no doubt that Kraepelin,
on the one hand, accepted and implemented degen-
eration theory into the debate on etiology and patho-
genesis of mental disorders. On the other hand, it is
not appropriate to draw a simple and direct line from
early versions of degeneration theory to the crimes of
psychiatrists and politicians during the rule of na-
tional socialism. What we need, is a differentiated
view, since this will be the only scientific one. Much
research needs to be done here in the future, and such
research will surely have a significant impact not only
on the historical field, but also on the continuous
debate about psychiatry, neuroscience and neurophi-
losophy.
j Key words Kraepelin degeneration theory Æ
history of psychiatry Æ naturalism Æ evolutionary
biology
Why this issue is important
Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926) is an influential figure in
the history of psychiatry and psychiatric concepts. This
fact alone would be reason enough to take a closer look
at the development of his thinking during the nearly
five decades of his active professional life. However,
there is an additional argument to do so: Emil Krae-
pelin, being so influential, is a good example for the
thesis that scientific psychiatry—in the nineteenth,
twentieth and twenty-first centuries—was and is highly
depending on theoretical concepts. They are changing
constantly and therefore have to be reflected upon
constantly and thoroughly. If that is not done, the
researcher will—unintentionally, in most cases—pave
the way for prejudice and dogma. To put it another way:
Kraepelin demonstrates the tension, not to say di-
lemma in which medicine in general and psychiatry in
particular are necessarily situated: The tension between
‘‘ars medica’’ on the one hand, being idiographically
oriented at subjectivity, qualitative features and the
interpersonal relationship between patient and doctor,
and the nomothetic approach of natural sciences on the
other hand, oriented at objective, quantitative and
reproducable data (see Fig. 1).
In 1995, Shepherd used this metaphor of medi-
cine’s and psychiatry’s ambiguity in a more specific
conceptual context, the context of degeneration the-
ory and Emil Kraepelin’s attitude towards it. For him,
Kraepelin and his thinking about the nature of psy-
chiatry revealed two highly different, even contra-
dictory ‘‘faces’’:
• the sound empirical scientist on the one hand, trying
to establish psychiatry as a reliable clinical science far
away from metaphysical speculation like in some of
the textbooks of romantic psychiatry 100 years earlier
• the ideological and idiosyncratic author on the other
hand, uncritically adopting the scientifically weak
positions of degeneration theory, of eugenics and even
of overt racism [27].
In another paper from the same year, Shepherd
commented on Kraepelin’s political views as carrying
‘‘disturbing overtones of proto-fascism’’ [28].
The main intention of the present paper is to elu-
cidate this issue not by analysing in detail the devel-
opment of his clinical nosology with regard to theEA
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influence of degeneration theory,1 but on the grounds
of a thorough look at the theoretical basis of Krae-
pelin’s psychiatry. The central thesis is that in Krae-
pelin’s view (and, by the way, in many of his
contemporaries’ views) there was no contradiction
between science and degeneration theory. Or, to put it
the other way round, he regarded degeneration theory
as scientifically sound. This, from my perspective, is
the most disturbing point.
Kraepelin’s psychiatry
j Starting points and aims
It was indeed Kraepelin’s main intention to further
establish psychiatry as a medical field with a strong
emphasis on clinical science, oriented at the method-
ological standards of natural sciences. And this, of
course, was part of the profound changes psychiatry
had undergone during the nineteenth century: Wilhelm
Griesinger (1817–1868) had marked a turning point by
calling for a clinical and pathophysiological research
based on the premise that ‘‘mental illness is a somatic
illness of the brain’’. But Griesinger’s theory was by far
not as simple as this one statement, which is so often
quoted in a misleading context. He held a very differ-
entiated view on the problem of somato- and
psychogenesis, although favouring the first in the case
of what was later to be called ‘‘endogenous psychoses’’
[8, 21861], [13].
Karl Ludwig Kahlbaum (1828–1899) continued the
traditions of French psychopathology as, for example,
represented by Falret and Bayle and developed a
clinically orientated research method in the second
half of the nineteenth century in Germany. He espe-
cially focussed on the course of illness. Griesinger’s
and Kahlbaum’s writings have ever since been re-
garded as clear refusals of the speculative concepts
rooted in the romantic era of psychiatry, but also of
the position of the harsh and unreflected ‘‘somati-
cists’’, who were no less dogmatic than some of the
‘‘psychicists’’ [22, 23]. Kahlbaum had clearly recog-
nized the methodological difference between patho-
logical–anatomical and clinical–psychopathological
work. With ‘‘progressive paralysis of the insane’’ as an
example he explained the way from the ‘‘syndrome-
course unit’’ (‘‘Syndrom-Verlaufs-Einheit’’) to
the—postulated—etiologically based ‘‘disease entity’’
(‘‘Krankheitseinheit’’) [14, 15].
As for this central idea of psychiatric ‘‘disease
entities’’, Kraepelin followed Kahlbaum and expanded
his position even further: Kraepelin postulated that
the essential features of all psychotic disorders will
eventually be classified in a ‘‘natural’’, i.e. primarily
biological system, no matter which scientific method
is applied: anatomy, etiology and symptomatology, if
developed sufficiently, will necessarily converge in the
same ‘‘natural disease entities’’ (see Fig. 2).
His nosology showed a remarkable stability over
time: From the 2nd to the 9th edition of his textbook, i.e.
from 1887 to 1927, Kraepelin did not change the central
postulate. This strong hypothesis is, however, limited
to a certain extent in three of his theoretical papers,
written between 1918 and 1920: ‘‘Ends and means of
psychiatric research’’ (1918) (‘‘Ziele und Wege der
psychiatrischen Forschung’’), ‘‘Research in the mani-
festations of mental illness’’ (1919) (‘‘Die Erforschung
psychischer Krankheitsformen’’) and ‘‘Clinical mani-
festations of mental illness’’ (1920) (‘‘Die Erschein-
ungsformen des Irreseins’’) [16–18]. In these papers
Kraepelin took into account contemporary arguments
such as Birnbaum’s differentiation between pathoge-
netic and pathoplastic factors in mental illness [1] or
Gaupp’s hypothesis of the possibility of psychogenic
delusions [7]. He now acknowledged the value of
defining certain syndromes as a medium level between
nosologically unspecific symptoms and specific dis-
eases. But—and this is the essential point—at no time
did he abandon his postulate of underlying distinct and
natural disease entities [11].
j Philosophical implications
Emil Kraepelin was not very interested in the philo-
sophical basis and implications of psychiatric theory
and practice. His view of what (natural) science was and
„Natural disease entities“
Clinical picture (incl. course)
Pathological anatomy Etiology
Fig. 2 Basic assumptions of Kraepelinian nosology
The „two faces“ of medicine
• Close relation to all
scientific areas
„Science“
• Close relation with natural 
sciences, especially biology
?„Ars medica“
• Subject
• Idiographic
• Object
• Nomothetic
• Reproducability not
that important
• Reproducability is crucial
• Focus on qualitative 
phenomena
• Focus on quantitative 
phenomena
Fig. 1 The ‘‘two faces’’ of medicine
1This would, for example, be one of the highly interesting scientific
topics that we need to deal with in the near future, as mentioned at
the end of this paper.
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what impact it had (or should have) on social and
political developments, was highly typical for the way
many European natural scientists saw themselves at the
turn of the nineteenth/twentieth century [5, 6]. Despite
his skeptical attitude towards theoretical consider-
ations in psychiatry, the following major theoretical
frameworks can be identified as underlying Kraepelin’s
concept of psychiatry, seldom explicitly, in most cases
very implicitly: Realism, parallelism, experimental ap-
proach, naturalism [10].
Realism
In contrast to the philosophical tradition of ‘‘German
idealism’’, e.g. Kant and Fichte, Kraepelin, like most of his
contemporaries in the field of natural sciences, believed in
an independently existing ‘‘real world’’, including other
people and their healthy or disturbed mental processes.
Kraepelin repeatedly pointed out that the psychiatric re-
searcher objectively has to describe what really exists and
what ‘‘nature presents to him’’—the formulations differ,
but the essence is a strictly realistic philosophy. The con-
sequences for psychiatric nosology are evident: Such
realism will lead to the concept of ‘‘natural disease enti-
ties’’ which exist completely independently of the re-
searcher. The scientist describes what he finds—or, in
stronger terms—describes ‘‘given things’’. His own
activity in constructing scientific hypotheses or diagnostic
entities is underestimated.
Parallelism
Kraepelin advocated psychophysical parallelism. Like
Wilhelm Griesinger, whom he admired for his critical
attitude towards speculative psychiatric theories, he
disapproved of reductionistic materialism, which
simply identifies mental events with neurophysio-
logical processes. Kraepelin spoke about two kinds of
phenomena, somatic and psychological, which are
decidedly different, but closely connected. Kraepelin
defended the existence of mental phenomena against
all kinds of what he (like Karl Jaspers) called ‘‘brain
mythologies’’. Contrary to his teacher and life-long
friend Wilhelm Wundt2 (1894), however, Kraepelin,
although calling himself a parallelist, did not enter the
detailed philosophical debate on this issue. In par-
ticular, he did not differentiate between parallelism
and interactionism and did not realize that any
strictly defined parallelism makes it more than
doubtful that mental life can still be regarded as an
independent sphere and not just as having a
1:1-relationship with the somatic level; and this, of
course, means (causal) determinism.
As a consequence of his somewhat ambivalent
position in the mind–body-debate, there is an im-
plicit tendency towards monism in Kraepelin’s
writings. But this monistic tendency was definitely
not a metaphysical one, but a weak version of
methodological monism, insofar he decidedly fa-
voured quantitative methods brought forward by the
natural sciences [29].
Experimental approach
For Kraepelin, the psychological experiment should
become the central scientific tool, not only for the
understanding of disturbed, but also healthy mental
processes. Both Wundt and Kraepelin realized the
difference between a physical and a psychological
experiment, but, for them, the experimental design
did not differ significantly in the two areas. Kraepelin
considered the experimental approach a kind of
guarantee for the scientific status of psychiatric
research. Therefore, it is obvious that he rated it
higher than mere description of clinical phenomena,
although the latter method was regarded to be indis-
pensable, especially if combined with follow-up
examinations. Kraepelin developed and maintained a
skeptical attitude toward subjective, especially
biographically determined aspects of mental disor-
ders, which could not be studied experimentally.
Naturalism
In his early writings—mainly in those on forensic
topics—Kraepelin clearly postulated that a priori
ideas, freedom of the will, and unchangeable moral
values do not exist. Instead, everything is basically a
natural, i.e. a biological, phenomenon, though more
or less dependent on the time and the specific so-
cial and cultural context in which it happens to
occur. For Kraepelin, man is nothing but a part of
nature, and anything man can do is only a product
of this natural existence. Thus Kraepelin comes
close to what is nowadays called evolutionary nat-
uralism, a theory with an increasing influence on
psychiatry [2, 12]. Later in his life, he became more
cautious concerning these matters, but there is no
reason to believe that he substantially changed his
mind. This naturalistic, ‘‘anti-metaphysical’’ point of
view, of course, made Kraepelin feel sympathetic
2The influence of the founder of experimental psychology, Wilhelm
Wundt (1832–1920), on Kraepelin can hardly be overestimated.
Wundt’s aim was to establish psychology as a kind of natural sci-
ence. He declined the speculative approach of the romantic ‘‘phi-
losophy of nature’’ (e.g. Schelling), but did not agree with
materialism or association psychology (e.g. Herbart) either. At least
in his earlier writings, Wundt favoured a parallelistic point of view
in the mind-body-problem: Experimental research may successfully
be used in psychology as in natural sciences, without thereby
ignoring the epistemological differences between the mental and
the physical [30].
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with Darwinistic and biologistic theories in general,
and with degeneration theory in particular. It
should be noted, however, that he rejected over-
simplifications such as in the monistic theories of
Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), Jakob Moleschott (1822–
1893), and Ludwig Bu¨chner (1824–1899).
Summarizing these epistemological considerations,
it can be concluded that Kraepelin’s psychiatry
became so influential, because it offered a pragmati-
cal, clinical and prognosis-oriented nosology, devel-
oped by a self-confident author who focussed on
rather straight-forward quantitative and naturalistic
research methods. He claimed to abandon speculative
aspects as far as possible, although he himself did
unintentionally ‘‘import’’ a number of implicit theo-
retical and, in part, highly speculative aspects into
psychiatry. What did that mean for his position
towards degeneration theory?
Kraepelin and degeneration theory
Degeneration theory had its roots in French psycho-
pathology, especially in the writings of Morel [24, 25]
and Magnan [20, 21]. The central idea of this concept
was that in ‘‘degenerative’’ illness there is a steady
decline in mental functioning and social adaptation
from one generation to the other. For example, there
might be a intergenerational development from ner-
vous characters to major depressive disorder, to overt
psychotic illness and, finally, to severe and chronic
cognitive impairment, i.e. dementia. It should be
noted, however, that this theory has always been a
vague and highly speculative concept, which was
brought forward decades before the rediscovery of
Mendelian genetics and their application to medicine
in general and to psychiatry in particular [3, 4, 9, 19,
26].
Kraepelin and with him most of the contemporary
authors of psychiatric textbooks used arguments
derived from degeneration theory broadly. He made a
special reference to them with regard to manic-
depressive illness, paranoia and personality disorders,
an interesting issue, which cannot be discussed here
in any more detail. But his attitude towards degen-
eration theory was not straightforward positive, but in
a way ambivalent: For example, as mentioned above,
due to his naturalistic framework, Kraepelin became
an early forerunner of evolutionary biology, which
was strongly reactivated by Konrad Lorenz’ writings
in the twentieth century. And the concept of dis-
ease—especially chronic mental disease—fitted very
well into this framework insofar these phenomena
were regarded as signs of an evolution into the wrong
direction, as ‘‘degeneration’’: A ‘‘degenerative’’ pro-
cess in this sense leaves the usual path of nature, the
‘‘genus’’. So far, Kraepelin was clearly advocating
degeneration theory.
However, he stayed sceptical against oversimplistic
versions of this concept: For example, although
commenting approvingly on the basic ideas of Cesare
Lombroso’s ‘‘criminal anthropology’’, he did not
accept the idea of overt ‘‘stigmata degenerationis’’, by
which individual persons could be identified as being
‘‘degenerated’’ simply by their physical appearance
[31]. This ambivalent relationship to a central theo-
retical question can also be seen in Kraepelin’s posi-
tion towards the mind-body-problem, where he
pragmatically voted for a parallelistic position on the
grounds of a methodological materalism, without
discussing the problematic consequences of such a
dualistic approach (see above).
Degeneration theory and national socialism:
the need for differentiation
The national socialist movement from its beginnings
until the end of World War II used central ideas of
degeneration theory, social darwinism and eugenics
to ‘‘scientifically’’ justify their barbaric world view
and—in the last consequence—the killing of people
whose lives where defined as ‘‘unworthy’’. Insofar it is
of utmost importance that historians of psychiatry
follow the lines from early concepts of degeneration
theory to the unprecedented cruelties of national
socialism. And it is equally important that prominent
figures in the history of psychiatry like Emil Kraepelin
and many others come under close scrutiny in this
context. But one has also to take the following caveats
into account:
• The concept of degeneration is highly heterogenous in
itself. Morel, for example, argued from a position of
philosophy of moral, whereas Magnan tried to link the
idea of degeneration with empirical science. And also
in the following decades authors addressed quite dif-
ferent issues when using the term degeneration. A
major reason for this is the fact that ‘‘degeneration’’
has never been a clearly defined scientific term.
• There is definitely a line from degeneration theory to
national socialism, but—as so often in the history of
ideas—it is not at all a simple and direct one. From a
political point of view, there have been right wing and
left wing supporters of the ideas of degeneration,
social Darwinism and eugenics in many countries. But
the national socialists in Germany happened to
become the only group with the political power to not
only think, but also put into action those ideas on a
big scale and until the last and cruel consequences.
• Therefore, it is neither a helpful nor a scientific
argument to label any psychiatric author drawing
upon degeneration theory as ‘‘proto-fascistic’’. This
important and delicate subject calls for a complete and
differentiated analysis prior to any judgement.
• The concept of ‘‘degeneration’’ always carried with it
an unpleasant ambiguity: Originally intended to be a
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scientific term within the realm of biology and natural
sciences, it then more and more loaded up with sci-
entific and political prejudices and finally ‘‘degener-
ated’’ itself into a primitive and extremely unscientific
pseudo-justification for the extermination programs
of the national socialists. It is obvious that this com-
plex process has to be dealt with scientifically, not
polemically.
Re´sume´: lessons to learn for present-day
psychiatry
An important task for history of psychiatry is to
demonstrate the relevance of ‘‘historical’’ questions
and answers for the present situation of psychiatry as
a clinical and research field. This can be shown for
many crucial psychiatric concepts like psychosis,
neurosis, psychopathy, mental illness, or diagnosis, to
mention only a few. But in a way this is also true for
the concept of ‘‘degeneration’’. Some arguments shall
underline this position:
• Degeneration theory became an important framework
for academic medicine and especially for psychiatry
during the last decades of the nineteenth and at the
beginning of the twentieth century, although it had
always been grounded more on speculative elements
than on empirical data or sound scientific reasoning.
Degeneration theory thus also influenced the classical
nosological concepts like the Kraepelinian one. These
again became cornerstones of psychiatric thinking
and diagnosing up to the present era of operational-
ized diagnostic systems like ICD 10 and DSM IV.
• Emil Kraepelin (and most of his contemporaries)
broadly used degeneration theory as a theoretical
framework for their pathogenetic and nosological
assumptions. But although arguments of degeneration
theory later were adopted and perverted by the national
socialists, this does not justify the conclusion that
Kraepelin’s psychiatry had ‘‘two faces’’, that were neatly
separated, the positive scientific one and the negative
ideological (or overtly racistic) one. For Kraepelin, the
question was not ‘‘science or degeneration theory?’’,
since degeneration theory, for him, was a scientific
concept. Of course, we may (and we should) critizice
him for this uncritical adoption, but we should not
overlook that his central issue was to further establish
psychiatry as a scientific medical specialty with
degeneration theory as an important element.
Expressed in Shepherd’s metaphor, we may conclude
that there was just one face of Kraepelin’s psychiatry
and of Emil Kraepelin himself, a ‘‘face’’, however, that
should be thoroughly examined by the historians of
psychiatry as for its complex role in the development of
degeneration theory, social Darwinism and eugenics.
• Naturalism was a dominant theoretical framework in
the second half of the nineteenth century—and it was
closely interwoven with the idea of degeneration. But
naturalism in different modern versions from mod-
erate to stern is also the cornerstone of what was
called biological psychiatry from about 1960 on and is
nowadays continuously merging with the broad term
neuroscience. And this inner link between Kraepelin’s
time and the present day situation, naturalism in all its
facets, should be a convincing argument to encourage
and promote further research into these theoretical
issues.
j Disclosure The author has no conflict of interest to declare.
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